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On the surface, the UK General Election appears to have resolved the 
foremost political issue of our times – Brexit. The large Conservative 
majority in the House of Commons means the Government’s 
Withdrawal Agreement will quickly pass through Parliament, and the 
UK will formally leave the European Union on 31st January 
2020.  ‘Brexit will be done’, the Department for Exiting the EU will 
close and Downing Street will no longer use the term ‘Brexit’ – since 
the UK will have ‘Brexit-ed’[i]. 
But behind the rhetoric and soundbites, what does ‘getting Brexit 
done’ actually entail? 
Post 31st January, 2020, the UK and the EU will enter a period of 
transition, in which the UK will remain in the Customs Union, the 
Single Market and under the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice until 31st December 2020 –although it will have no say on EU 
rules. During the 11-month transition period, the UK will seek to 
negotiate a new trading relationship with the EU – its’ biggest market. 
This 11-month timeframe is incredibly tight – on average, Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) take several years to negotiate! Yet, the 
government has indicated it will remove its own room for manoeuvre 
by legislating against any extension. This raises the possibility of 
another cliff-edge no-deal scenario, in which the UK may end up 
trading on World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules[iii]. 
No deal is the worst-case scenario and will mean UK businesses 
facing damaging tariff and non-tariff barriers (such as new regulatory 
barriers) when exporting into the EU Single Market. Relying on WTO 
rules also means the UK will have little leeway in changing its own 
import tariffs since – outside of an FTA – if it arbitrarily decides to 
reduce import tariffs on say cars from Brazil, it has to extend this tariff 
reduction to all other countries (including the EU), under the Most 
Favoured Nation Clause. Moreover, any import tariff reduction does 
not have to be reciprocated. 
Calls by some Brexiteers to slash all import tariffs, post-Brexit, would 
undoubtedly cause substantial damage to the UK’s manufacturing 
base and agriculture which would be cruelly exposed to low-cost 
foreign competition and ‘dumping’. 
So, post Brexit, the most pressing challenge for Boris Johnson’s new 
government is to secure a new trade deal with the EU. While 
remaining in the Single market and Customs Union, would limit the 
adverse economic consequences of Brexit (and ensure there is no 
hard border on the island of Ireland), both have been ruled out, since 
they cross the government’s own red lines[iv]. 
Instead, a Canada style FTA[v] (CETA) has been suggested. This 
would eliminate the majority of tariffs and might allow the UK to 
diverge on regulations, such as on worker’s rights, consumer and 
environmental protections. Services are, however, unlikely to be 
covered – at least initially – by such an agreement. A CETA type deal 
would still mean border checks, with UK manufacturers having to 
comply with ‘rules of origin’ and ‘local content’ restrictions which may 
be difficult to meet given the complex nature of UK supply chains. 
Indeed, UK supply chains are highly integrated within the Single 
Market, with components for cars and aerospace often criss-crossing 
the Channel several times before ending up in the finished product. 
The end of seamless, frictionless trade with the EU may mean lengthy 
border checks and invariably lead to significant job losses, lost 
investment and falling real incomes. Ironically, those UK regions 
that[vii] predominantly voted to leave will be the most adversely 
affected – largely because they are relatively more reliant upon 
manufacturing and exports to the EU. 
It was these ‘Leave’ areas which voted Conservative at the recent 
General Election – breaking ‘the red wall’ – and gave Boris Johnson 
his majority in the House of Commons. The government will be 
desperate to ensure any post Brexit, EU trade deal will not damage 
the livelihoods of its new electoral base. Industries based in these 
new Tory heartlands[viii] such as automotive, aerospace, textiles and 
ceramics (whose main markets are the EU), are especially vulnerable. 
Yet while the government has a healthy majority in Parliament, this 
does not strengthen their bargaining position with the EU, who will be 
keen to maintain the integrity of the Single Market.    Indeed, imposing 
a legal restriction not to extend the transition period actually weakens 
the UK’s bargaining position – since it confines the time to strike a 
deal. A game of ‘chicken’ is likely to ensue and who will blink 
first?[ix] It should be noted that in revising Theresa May’s Withdrawal 
Agreement, the government crossed one of its own red lines when 
they agreed to a customs border in the Irish Sea. 
Could a quick trade deal with the US soften the blow? Striking such a 
deal, would be politically expedient but one should be wary of deals 
done in haste. Tariffs between the UK and US are already very low, 
and the UK already enjoys a trade surplus[xi] and benefits from over 
100 EU-US bilateral agreements spanning different industries/sectors. 
It is widely known US farmers are keen to gain access UK agricultural 
markets, while US healthcare providers and pharmaceutical 
companies are eager to gain greater access to the NHS. By their 
nature, trade negotiations often favour the bigger party (which in this 
case would be the US). Would the UK accept lower agricultural and 
food standards (hormone beef injected beef/chlorine washed 
chicken?), or longer patents on pharmaceuticals which would force up 
drug prices for the NHS?[xii] If not, would Boris Johnson’s government 
walk away from such a deal? 
These are sensitive issues for the Johnson government, and he would 
be wise to go beyond the simple soundbites and pay attention to the 
actual detail. Otherwise, the Conservatives new-found favour in those 
Leave constituencies will be soon turn to anger and recrimination. He 
should also be aware that in terms of votes cast at the General 
Election, 53% of the electorate backed parties that favoured Remain 
or offered a second referendum (with a soft Brexit option).  Failure to 
bring these electors on side will mean that an 80 seat majority will not 
be impregnable in 2024. 
Indeed, rather than Brexit being done, 2020 will see the start of a 
decade in the UK become involved in a series of intense and lengthy 
negotiations that will last sometime, as it seeks to secure a new set of 
bilateral trade deals. Get ready for the ride – it’s likely to be very 
bumpy! 
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